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ASSESSING HUMAN-SYSTEM RESILIENCE POTENTIAL THROUGHOUT THE 
DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE* 
Amy L. Alexander
MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MIT LL)
Lexington, MA USA
Dan Herschler
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Washington DC, USA
We worked with subject matter experts to create a human-system resilience
checklist that can be utilized during Independent Operational Assessments (IOAs)
of air traffic control systems as part of the system acquisition process. The
checklist focuses on four key areas for evaluating human-system resilience 
characteristics: procedures, system use, workload, and training. A resilience
scoring method indicates areas where a human-machine system under
consideration does or does not have resilient characteristics. Overall resilience
scores can be compared among design alternatives, or across different points in 
system development for a particular design. The ultimate intent is to provide
guidance and metrics that will enable the FAA to address human-system 
resilience aspects in the implementation of NextGen capabilities in the National 
Airspace System (NAS). The goal of increased resilience is to reduce the risks
and potential impacts of disruptive events, and to safeguard the efficiency, safety,
and cost effectiveness of NextGen NAS operations.  
The Federal Aviation Administration’s NextGen program uses many complex systems
and technologies to increase the efficiency, safety, and cost effectiveness of the National
Airspace System. Although NextGen systems are designed to achieve defined system availability
requirements, system degradation and failure are still a very real, if remote, possibility. 
Designing and assessing systems with resilience to failures in mind can reduce the risks or
potential impacts of degradations. Looking to the literature, there are a variety of definitions of
resilience (see Reason, 2000; Sheridan, 2008); however, a number of common characteristics
emerge relating to anticipating adverse effects, withstanding unexpected conditions, maintaining 
control, sustaining operations, and recovering quickly when something goes wrong. Resilience is
defined by the FAA as maintaining safety and a minimum level of service in reaction to system 
failures or degradations (FAA, 2016). The underlying goal is to prevent or mitigate impacts on
air traffic operations.
Previous work (e.g., Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) has identified characteristics
of resilient organizations and human-machine systems, and initial experimental methods for
assessing resilience potential have been developed. However, these methods primarily apply to 
existing or well-prototyped systems. In an effort to assess the resilience potential of an
* DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
This material is based upon work supported by the Federal Aviation Administration under Air Force Contract No.
FA8702-15-D-0001. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Aviation Administration.
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id;i,nco Phue/ Roforonco Scoring 
Document 
risk. 
8. For this human-machine system, what are PSP, IIA 4.2.2 O 0: System resilience metrics not 
indicators of successful system performance? identified 
Of degraded system perfor mance? Of a fa iled O 1: System resilience metrics 
system ? can these indicators be specified by identified 
certain measurable quahties? Such qualit ies 0 2: System resilience metrics 
and indical ors can be used in combinatiOns as identified and conSidered 
indicaton of human-machine system resilience~ appropriate 
Do the metrics appropriately meawre ~)'stem 
recovery and performance levels after adverse 
events? 
Rationale: To determine if the system is re:slhent, practtt iOners should idenhfy metrics that indicate the system's 
ability to adapt to, react to, and learn from abnormal condrtions. These metrics can be found by selecting t-•ients 
or o ther ind icators of degraded performance, such a.s a hazardous weather ~ent, and monitoring a performance-
metric, such as throughpu t, ~ fore and after the event to determine-how w ell performance returns after an 
.,,.,nl 
9. What are the minimum performance levels for PSP, IIA 4.2.2 D 0: Baseline metric values not set 
the resilience metrics? (e.g. < 3 minutes to D 1: Baseline metric values set 
return to an acceptance rate or 25 aircraft per 
minute after an event} 
Rationale: To determine if the system i..s resilient, practiUoners need to set a baseline for the nominal acceptable 
level of performance for each of the selected re$ilience metrics so that later performance data can be compared 
against the required performance. 
operational capability earlier in the system development lifecycle, we worked with subject matter
experts to create a human-system resilience checklist that can be utilized during Independent
Operational Assessments (IOAs) of FAA air traffic control systems as part of the system
acquisition process. The checklist focused on four key areas, identified through collaboration 
with subject matter experts in conjunction with review of the resilience literature, that should be
considered when evaluating human-system resilience characteristics: procedures, system use,
workload, and training. A resilience scoring method was developed to provide an indication of
areas where a system under consideration does or does not have resilient characteristics. The 
overall resilience score can then be compared to design alternatives, or across different points in 
the system development lifecycle for that particular design and operational context. The checklist
and scoring system has yet to be validated, but upcoming IOA testing is anticipated to provide
insight and feedback about the utility of this approach for assessing human-system resilience. 
Method
The first step in creating the human-system resilience checklist was to identify resilient 
characteristics of NextGen systems, including ways to build, enhance, and assess the resilience
of complex human-machine systems. MIT LL conducted a literature review on characteristics of
resilient systems, particularly focused on human-automation systems (Yenson et al., 2015). 
System reliability, system predictability, and operator engagement emerged as three key areas for
examining resilience potential. The identified characteristics of resilient automation systems
were then translated into a list of phrases (e.g., a resilient system is able to handle “unknown 
unknown” situations). These phrases formed the basis of a resilience job aid that was originally
developed in reference to the safety risk management (SRM) process, without a specific target 
application or end user group. An excerpt from this job aid is presented in Figure 1. The job aid 
specifically pointed out questions to ask and actions to take, provided detailed explanations and 
rationales, references to SRM documentation, and included a basic scoring method for assessing
resilience potential.
Figure 1. Original Resilience Job Aid Excerpt
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Are detailed and appropriate 
procedures ava ilable for a wide See sub-question responses below : 
range of situations, including: 
a. System usage under 1: Yes, but most 2: Yes, but some 
nominal conditions? 0: No procedures need to be procedures need to 3: Yes 
improved be improved 
b. The most frequent and/or 1: Yes, but most 2: Yes, but some 
critica l known off-nom inal 0: No procedures need to be procedures need to 3: Yes 
events? improved be improved 
C. Assessing system recovery 1: Yes, but most 2:. Yes, but some 
and performance levels 0:No procedures need to be procedures need to 3: Yes 
after adverse events? improved be improved 
d. Bri nging the system dow n 1: Yes, but most 2: Yes, but some I 
and back online for 0: No procedures need to be procedures need to 3: Yes 
maintenance? improved be improved 
1: Yes, but most 2: Yes, but some 
e. Certification of systems? 0: No procedures need to be proced ures need to 3: Yes 
improved be improved 
Comments: 
Various discussions regarding resilience with the FAA led us to the Independent Safety
Assessment Team (AJI-321) of the FAA Air Traffic Organization’s (ATO) Safety and Technical
Training office, which is responsible for conducting independent operational assessments (IOAs) 
of designated NextGen systems. IOAs verify new FAA systems or solutions are suitable, 
operationally effective, and safe prior to deployment in the NAS. Specifically:
• IOAs are independent from the FAA office responsible for deploying the new
system/capability.
• IOAs are conducted at operational key sites during live NAS operations.
• IOAs are major structured assessments with the purpose of identifying safety hazards
and operational concerns with new systems/capabilities.
AJI-321 agreed for IOA to be a focus area for our work, and we coordinated across seven
working group meetings to review the original resilience job aid and customize it for use during
IOAs. We determined that a more streamlined checklist would be most appropriate for the IOA
context. Working group meetings then focused on carefully reviewing the overall checklist 
content, categorizing questions in a meaningful way, and revising the wording of the questions
and their associated responses. Usability and usefulness of the checklist as well as a resilience 
scoring system were also discussed as our checklist development progressed. 
Checklist
The final checklist contained questions broken down into four key categories for 
evaluating human-system resilience characteristics: procedures, system use, workload, and 
training. Example questions from each checklist section are presented in Figures 2-5. Questions
were presented with up to four response options, each having a point value associated with it as
well as a color-coded indicator of goodness (red: not indicative of a resilient system, yellow: 
resiliency needs improvement; green: indicative of a resilient system). The evaluator was
instructed to select the most appropriate response for each question, and there were comment
fields for any additional notes that would be helpful to capture.
Figure 2. Example Procedures Checklist Questions
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9. Does the system notify the 1: For some 2: For most 
3: For all 
controller if a degradation occurs? 0: No critical critical 
functions 
functions functions 
Comments: 
10. Are there design aspects within 
1: For some 2: For most 
the system (e.g., alerts, warnings) 
0: No critical crit ical 
3: For all 
that safeguard against controller 
functions functions 
functions 
errors and adverse conditions? 
Comments: 
24. What types of tasks are 
0: Tasks involve more 0: Tasks involve more 2: Tasks are the 
performed by the controller 
passive monitoring active engagement appropriate 
under steady-state (i.e ., 
than intended than intended passive/active mix nominal) conditions? 
Comments: 
25. Under steady-state conditions, 
0: Workload is too low 0: Workload is too 
does the syst em allow for an 2: Workload is 
appropriate controller workload 
- controller is high - controller is 
appropriate 
level? 
disengaged overloaded 
Comments: 
33. Which of the following are 
provided as part of the 
See sub-question responses below: human-machine system 
training protocol? 
1: Yes, but 2: Yes, but 
3: Yes, a. Minimum training 0: Not requirements need requirements need 
requirements? addressed to be greatly to be somewhat 
addressed 
improved improved 
adequately 
1: Yes, but t raining 
2: Yes, but training 
3: Yes, b. Training on system 0: Not needs to be 
vulnerabilities? addressed 
needs to be greatly 
somewhat 
addressed 
improved 
improved 
adequately 
C. Operational aids (e.g., 2: Yes, but aids 
cheat sheet, help line) 0: Not 
1: Yes, but aids need 
need to be 
3: Yes, 
for less-experienced addressed 
to be greatly 
somewhat 
addressed 
users? improved improved 
adequately 
d . Training sessions on 1: Yes, but training 
2: Yes, but training 
3: Yes, 
0: Not needs to be 
contingency addressed 
needs to be greatly 
somewhat 
addressed 
procedures? improved improved 
adequately 
Training sessions on 1: Yes, but training 
2: Yes, but training 
3: Yes, e. 0: Not needs to be 
novel events? addressed 
needs to be greatly 
somewhat addressed 
improved 
improved 
adequately 
Comments: 
Figure 3. Example System Use Checklist Questions
Figure 4. Example Workload Checklist Questions
Figure 5. Example Training Checklist Questions
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Procedure Resilience Scorecard 
Question 
Response Max Score Possible 
Score (Benchmark) 
1. 3 
2. 3 
3a. 3 
3b. 3 
4a. 3 
4b. 3 
4c. 3 
4d. 3 
4e. 3 
5. 1 
6. 1 
Total 29 
0 - 9: Low Procedure Resilience 
10 - 19: Moderate Procedure Resilience 
20 - 29: High Procedure Resilience 
Overall Resilience Scorecard 
Category 
Category Max Score Possible 
Score (Benchmark) 
Procedures 29 
System Use 37 
Workload 20 
Training 47 
Other (Q40J 1 
Total 134 
0-44: Low Resilience 
45 - 89: Moderate Resi lie nee 
90 - 134: High Resilience 
Checklist Scoring
A basic scoring system was developed to tally across responses and provide an ordinal
resilence score for each of the four categories. An example resilience scorecard for the 
procedures category is presented in Figure 6. Total points possible are broken into three levels to 
provide a general assessment of low/moderate/high human-system resilience. Individual category
scores can then be combined to provide an overall human-system resilience score, as shown in
Figure 7.
Figure 6. Procedure Resilience Scorecard
Figure 7. Overall Resilience Scorecard
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This simple scoring system was developed so as not to imply any unwarranted precision 
in quantifying certain responses or categories over others. The notion here is that the checklist
provides an indication of areas where a system under consideration does or does not have
resilient characteristics, and a basis of comparison among design alternatives, or across different
points in system development for a particular design, to determine if the design of a system is
improving over time from a resilience perspective.
Conclusions
In an effort to assess the resilience potential of a system, we worked with subject matter
experts to create a human-system resilience checklist that can be utilized during IOAs of air
traffic control systems as part of the system acquisition process. The checklist and scoring
method presented here have yet to be validated, but application of the revised checklist during
upcoming IOA testing may provide initial validation and feedback about the utility of the 
checklist approach for assessing human-system resilience.
Acknowledgements
This material is based upon work supported by the Federal Aviation Administration 
under Air Force Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0001. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the United States Government or the Federal Aviation Administration.
References
Federal Aviation Administration (2016). Performance Based Navigation NAS Navigation 
Strategy 2016. US Department of Transportation.
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D., & Leveson, N. (2006). Resilience Engineering: Concepts and 
Precepts. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006.
Reason, J. (2000). Reducing human error through safety management practices. Presented at The
14th Annual FAA/CAA/Transport Canada Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance
Symposium. Vancouver, Canada. Retrieved from: 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/mx_faa_(f 
ormerly_hfskyway)/strategic_program_plan_(1998)/14th_symposium/reducing_human_e 
rror_through_safety_management_practices.pdf
Sheridan, T. (2008) Risk, human error, and system resilience: Fundamental ideas. Human 
Factors, 50, 418-426. doi: 10.1518/001872008X250773
Yenson, S. K., Phillips, S., Davis, A., & Won, J. (2015). Exploring human-system resilience in
air traffic management technologies. Presented at the 2015 IEEE/AIAA 34th Digital 
Avionics Systems Conference. DASC. doi: 10.1109/DASC.2015.7311403  
66
